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November 1965] Recent Developments 
Evidence illegally Seized by Private Persons 
Excluded From Criminal Prosecution-
People v. McComb* 
143 
Defendant's wife and a private detective rented units on either 
side of defendant's motel room, placed an electronic listening device 
bet1veen one of the units and defendant's room, and entered defen-
dant's room with a key obtained by bribing the chambermaid. 
Photographs were taken, and clothing and bedding were seized; 
this evidence was delivered to the prosecutor, who brought a criminal 
action for adultery. The Circuit Court for Calhoun County, Michi-
gan, held that evidence obtained by private persons through an 
entry and taking which are criminal under state law must be ex-
cluded from a subsequent criminal prosecution.1 Exclusion was 
considered necessary, on non-constitutional grounds, to preserve -the 
integrity of the law-enforcement process and to prevent collusive 
agreements bet1veen the police and private persons. 
At common law, illegally seized evidence was admissible on the 
theory that the nature of the seizure did not necessarily affect the 
probative value of the evidence.2 However, in 1914 the United 
States Supreme Court, in order to protect the fourth amendment's 
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
adopted a rule excluding from federal courts evidence illegally seized 
by federal officials.8 In 1961, the scope of this rule was extended by 
Mapp v. Ohio,4 which held that all evidence obtained in violation of 
the fourth amendment is inadmissible in state courts. However, the 
Mapp doctrine applies only to "official lawlessness,"5 not to unlawful 
private seizures. Since Burdeau v. McDowell,6 in which the Supreme 
Court held that the Constitution does not forbid the admission in 
evidence in a criminal trial of papers illegally seized by private 
persons, state and federal courts have refused to exclude evidence 
in criminal prosecutions unless there was some official involvement 
in the unlawful search and seizure.7 However, the Michigan Supreme 
• Finding, Doc. No. 21-225, Calhoun County Cir. Ct. Mich., Feb. 24, 1965 (herein-
after cited as principal case). 
1. The court found that there had been an illegal entry without permission, that 
the taking of the key by .the chambermaid was larceny, and that removal of the evi-
dence constituted larceny from a building under MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 750.115, .356, 
.360 (1948). 
2. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636 (1924); Commonwealth 
v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. 
denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926). See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 137 (1954); 8 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5. Id. at 655. (Emphasis added.) 
6. 256 U.S. 465 (1921). 
7. E.g., United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 
(1964); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People v. 
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Court has not been strictly insistent upon finding official involve-
ment as a prerequisite for excluding evidence considered offensive. 
In a 1958 civil wrongful death action, the court held that a blood 
sample taken by a private nurse without the defendant's consent 
was inadmissible because the "taking" violated the right to privacy 
granted by a Michigan constitutional provision similar to the fourth 
amendment.8 Although the fourth amendment to the federal con-
stitution is now applicable to the states through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 9 under Burdea1.4 there is no 
constitutional violation unless a governmental agency is involved 
in the illegal search and seizure. 
Within accepted definitions of "state action,"10 there would 
seem to be no official involvement in the principal case sufficient to 
render the evidence constitutionally inadmissible under Mapp. 
The conduct of the detective would not become state action until 
he asserted official authority, which was not done in the principal 
case.11 Similarly, use of the illegally seized evidence by the prosecu-
tor would not constitute a ratification under ordinary agency prin-
ciples unless the detective had purported to act for the state during 
the illegal seizure.12 Furthermore, mere receipt of evidence by the 
trial court would seem to fall outside the scope of the state-action 
Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P .2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957): Gilliam v. Common• 
wealth, 263 Ky. 342, 92 S.W.2d 346 (1936). . 
8. Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). Michigan is apparently 
the only state in which such evidence would be excluded in a civil action. See text ac• 
companying note 33 infra. See also People v. Corder, 244 Mich, 274, 221 N.W. 309 
(1928), holding that testimony by a private physician as to an examination made 
without the defendant's consent is inadmissible as being in violation of Michigan 
constitutional provisions against self-incrimination. 
9. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), where the court interpreted Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), as having applied the fourth amendment to the states 
through the due process clause. For a discussion as to whether Wolf actually did 
extend the fourth amendment in toto to the states, see Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten 
Years Later-Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN, L. REV, 1083, 
1101-08 (1959). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963), holding that the 
fourth amendment's standard of the reasonableness of a search is applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment. 
10. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM, L. REY, 1083 
(1960). 
11. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951). Although the court 
in the principal case mentioned that a private detective is issued a metal badge by 
the state, principal case at 14, there is no evidence -that the badge was used by the 
detective to gain admission, to obtain the key, or for any other purpose. According to 
the court, the detective has a "special status" derived in part from the fact that he is 
licensed under Michigan law. Principal case at 15. See M1cH, CoMP. LAws § 338.801 
(1948). Some members of the United States Supreme Court, particularly Mr, Justice 
Douglas, have urged extension of the state-action doctrine to state-licensed facilities, 
See, e.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282 (1963) (concurring opinion); Gamer 
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) (concurring opinion). This argument has not yet 
been accepted by the full Court, however, and has been advocated only in the context 
of the equal protection clause. See note 14 infra. 
12. Rl?sTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 85(1) (1948). 
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concept announced in Shelley v. Kraemer,13 which forbids judicial 
enforcement of private arrangements that would violate the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment if entered into by 
the state.14 Thus, in excluding illegally seized evidence from a 
criminal trial without insistence on finding state action, the principal 
case represents a significant departure from the line of cases stem-
ming from Burdeau v. McDowezz.w 
Recognizing that the lack of any official involvement in the illegal 
taking precluded exclusion of the evidence on federal constitutional 
grounds, the court turned to policy arguments to effect a similar re-
sult on non-constitutional grounds.16 The objections of the court to 
the admission of illegally seized evidence have often been raised be-
fore.17 The need to preserve the integrity of the law-enforcement 
process has led the courts to impose rigorous standards of behavior 
on the police and on themselves. Thus, the courts have recognized 
that disrespect for law and order is engendered when police and 
prosecutors are allowed to benefit from illegal acts. The state, it 
has been felt, ought to be the model rather than the evader of legal 
propriety.18 The principal case adopted this rationale vis-a-vis the 
13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
14. Shelley is primarily an equal-protection doctrine, as illustrated by the following 
cases in which the question of its applicability arose: Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 
256 (1964) (concurring opinion); id. at 328 (dissenting opinion); Black v. Cutter Labs, 
351 U.S. 292 (1956): Rice v. Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954); Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); In re Girard College 
Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). There are 
other indications that the concept of state judicial action would not be applied to the 
principal case. First, there has been some reluctance to extend Shelley beyond its 
particular facts. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Labs, supra; Rice v. Memorial Park Ceme• 
tery, supra; In re Girard College Trusteeship, supra. Second, judicial involvement in 
admission of illegal evidence has been condemned on non-constitutional grounds as 
recently as 1960. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See also Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion); Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion). See generally Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer-
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 473 (1962); Lewis, supra note 10, at 
1108-20. 
15. See cases cited note 7 supra. An even more radical departure from the Burdeau 
principle was the lower-court opinion in Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 
N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962), which 
excluded evidence illegally obtained by the husband in a civil divorce action on the 
ground that Mapp "points the way" to exclusion where private persons are involved 
and that a New York law similar to the fourth amendment required exclusion of such 
evidence. See 48 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 345 (1962); 46 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1119 (1962); 72 YALE 
L.J. 1062 (1963). Compare Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958), 
discussed at note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
16. While the court spoke in broad language of a fundamental constitutional right 
to privacy, it nowhere explicitly stated that the exclusion was based on such a right. 
See principal case at 5, 8. 
17. E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); cases cited note 18 infra. 
18. See, e.g., Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Spano v. New York, 
360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 483 (1928) 
(dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465,477 (1921) (dissenting opinion by Brandeis, J.). 
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prosecutor and apparently extended it to private detectives, who in 
its view enjoy a "special status" under Michigan law and are bound 
to a higher standard of compliance with law than other citizens,19 
Courts have also been unwilling to compromise their own integ-
rity by becoming involved in attempts by the government to benefit 
from illegal acts. In Elkins v. United States,20 the Supreme Court, 
exercising its supervisory power over federal courts, excluded from 
federal criminal prosecutions evidence illegally gathered by state 
officials and given to federal officials. This rejection of the "silver 
platter" doctrine was based partly on the ground that the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity" demanded exclusion;21 when courts permit 
the perpetration of illegal schemes they themselves become "accom-
plices in willful disobedience to law."22 
Perhaps the most serious non-constitutional objection to permit-
- ting the use in evidence of the fruit of illegal private seizures is 
the opportunity for collusion between the police or prosecutor and 
private persons, especially detectives or informants. It seems clear 
that if a prior agreement between officials and private persons were 
proved, the evidence seized pursuant to the agreement would be 
constitutionally inadmissible, because the state itself would have 
conspired to violate the fourth amendment.23 Thus, private illegal 
seizures could merely be a mask for constitutionally prohibited 
conduct, and otherwise inadmissible evidence might have to be ad-
mitted, under the Burdeau doctrine, unless collusion were actually 
proved. The principal case recognizes the danger of police-private 
party coalitions but fails to justify the exclusion of the evidence 
absent proof of such a coalition.24 
Some support for excluding evidence without proof of collusion 
may be found in the difficulty for the defendant of proving an illicit 
agreement and in the inadequacy of other remedies to deter private 
illegal seizures. In many instances the defendant is not in a position 
to learn of, much less prove, the existence of an agreement between 
private persons and the police. Moreover, it seems doubtful that 
the right to call the alleged participants to testify would protect 
the defendant. The defendant may not even suspect the involve-
ment of private persons; even if he does, he may not be able to 
19. The "special status" is derived by the court from the fact that Michigan law 
requires a detective to be licensed, approved by the sheriff and the prosecutor in the area 
in which he intends to operate, and issued a metal badge by the state. See principal 
case at 15; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.801, .802, .808 (1948). 
20. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
21. Id. at 222. 
22. Id. at 223, quoting McNabb v. United States, 31~ U.S. 332, 345 (1943). 
23. As ,to the degree of cooperation necessary to constitute a conspiratorial agreement 
and the problems posed by that issue in the silver-platter situation prior to Elliins, see 
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1171-77. 
24. See principal case at 13, 15. 
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identify the private participant. This could leave the defendant to 
establish existence of the agreement solely by the testimony of a 
public official who entered the agreement with the purpose of cir-
cumventing Mapp v. Ohio. 
Despite the fact that private individuals do not enjoy the privi-
leged status often afforded to police, civil remedies for illegal entry 
and seizure are unlikely to prove more effective against private in-
dividuals than they were before Mapp against the police.25 The 
speculative or nominal nature of damages for trespass and invasion 
of privacy and the possible ignorance of aggrieved persons as to 
their right to compensation militate against the effectiveness of 
civil remedies as deterrents. Criminal sanctions, even where they 
exist,26 tend to be ineffective, since the prosecutor would rarely, 
if ever, prosecute his own staff and would be very reluctant to 
jeopardize his relations with the police by prosecuting a policeman · 
or his private accomplice.27 
On the other hand, the existence of a prior agreement would 
seem to be less likely in connection with an illegal private seizure 
than in the typical "silver-platter" situation involving large numbers 
of individuals associated with two distinct, yet commonly cooperating 
law enforcement systems.28 It would appear that at least in the 
clearest cases of illegal seizures by one or two identified private 
persons, the evidence could be admitted more freely without the 
danger that hidden agreements might lurk in the background. In 
such cases, a more moderate procedure might be preferable to 
automatic exclusion due to the mere possibility of a secret collusive 
agreement._For instance, where evidence admittedly seized illegally 
by an identified private person is offered and the possibility of col-
lusion exists, a burden of persuasion might be· placed upon the state 
to establish the lack of collusion.29 The trial judge could then admit 
or exclude the evidence in his discretion, considering such factors 
as whether the private person is present for cross-examination, 
whether that person maintains a close working relationship with 
25. As to the ineffectiveness of civil remedies as deterrents against illegal conduct 
by the police, see Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 
MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 
Nw. U.L. REv. 65 (1957). The "obvious futility of relegating the fourth ame~dment 
to the protection of other remedies," was recognized in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652. 
26. See generally Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and 
Seizures, 41 VA. L. REv. 621 (1955), indicating that such sanctions are not common 
and that where they do exist prosecutions are almost non-existent. 
27. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (dissenting opinion). 
28. See generally Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1180-90. 
29. Cf. Hogan &: Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule-Its Rise, Rationale and 
Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-29 (1958), suggesting that problems of proof in establishing 
coercion during prolonged pre-commitment detentions of the defendant might have 
been overcome by creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness. But cf. 
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1192-93 n.382. 
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the police, 30 and whether the police at the time of the seizure were 
especially interested in the kind of activities in which the accused 
was allegedly engaged. 
The principal case is illustrative of the conclusion that the theory 
that there may be secret agreements will not support the exclusion 
as a matter of law of all evidence illegally obtained by private 
persons. The detective and his assistant both testified, and there 
was no dispute as to whether anyone else was involved in the illegal 
entry. The court was careful to point out that in its opinion there 
was no collusion between the detective and the police.81 Moreover, 
the case for exclusion to avoid possible secret agreements is not 
nearly so clear in a criminal adultery prosecution as it would be 
had there been an illegal private seizure in connection with an 
abortion, narcotics, or gambling prosecution. Adultery prosecutions 
are more likely to be the afterthought of an irate spouse than a pre-
arranged plan of the police. 
It seems clear that one effect of extending the exclusionary rule 
to unlawful private seizures would be to limit the amount and type 
of information that could be supplied to law enforcement agencies 
by informants, the extent of the limitation varying with the ration-
ale used to exclude. Although exclusion because of the possibility 
of secret agreements is not constitutionally compelled, its purpose 
is to prevent hidden constitutional violations stemming from clan-
destine delegations by the police of their authority and from con-
spiratorial acquisitions of evidence. Thus, under this theory there 
would be no reason to exclude the ordinary inforIJ?.ant's "tip" based 
on rumor or personal knowledge obtained by conduct which, even 
if illegal, did not constitute an "unreasonable search and seizure." 
On the other hand, where the judicial-integrity approach is the 
rationale for exclusion, any information obtained by conduct deemed 
"illegal" could be excluded. However, the government's right to 
use informants is well established and has not been viewed as 
corrupting the law-enforcement process.82 Nevertheless, it would 
seem that a distinction could be dra·wn between a situation in which 
the procurement of the evidence was merely incidental to the in-
formant's illegal activity, such as incriminating statements heard 
30. Such persons would include not only detectives and informers, but also indi• 
viduals belonging to vigilante groups or extremist organizations, such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, which may have the sympathy of police departments in particular areas. Sec 
generally Black, Burdeau v. McDowell-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Abso• 
lutism, 12 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1932). 
31. Principal case at 15. A striking example of such collusion is People v. Rogers, 
261 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1965), in which a telephone operator, after eavesdropping on the 
defendant's incriminating telephone conversations, voluntarily informed the police 
and thereafter cooperated with them in obtaining further evidence. 
32. See generally HARNEY & CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 13-21 (1960); 
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 
60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Comment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 840 (1965). 
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during an illegal gambling session, and one in which the evidence 
was obtained pursuant to a search and seizure the only purpose of 
which was the acquisition of evidence. It would appear that al-
though the evidence in the former situation should be admissible 
to preserve the government's right to use informants, the latter 
evidence should be excluded where the state recognizes a legal 
right to be free from unauthorized intrusions.33 
A second effect of the exclusion in criminal cases of evidence 
illegally gathered by private persons is that an analogy could be 
provided for excluding similar evidence in civil cases. Evidence 
illegally gathered by private persons is now admitted in civil cases 
everywhere except in Michigan,34 while evidence illegally gathered 
by public officials is generally excluded from civil cases.35 If exclusion 
in criminal cases were based on the possibility of collusion, no anal-
ogy for exclusion in civil cases would exist unless the state were in-
volved in the suit. However, the need to "preserve the judicial process 
from contamination,"36 which is the basis of the judicial-integrity 
concept, would seem to be as real in civil actions as in criminal and 
thus would demand exclusion in both. Since the integrity of the 
court rather than that of the plaintiff is involved, the rule could 
lead to the harsh result that the plaintiff would lose an otherwise 
valid right to compensation merely by introducing illegally seized 
evidence without knowing of its illegal seizure.37 On the other hand, 
it has been argued that exclusion is the only effective deterrent 
against persons willing to run the risk of a light penalty in order 
to obtain valuable evidence for use in civil actions.38 
The result in the principal case seems consistent with Michigan 
33. See generally Edwards, supra note 26; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 
(1960). In ,the few states that do not recognize a right to privacy, the evidence could 
be admissible since the search and seizure was not technically illegal. Even here, 
however, a broad reading of the judicial-integrity approach could require exclusion 
where the conduct, although not illegal, was highly improper. 
34. E.g., Calumet Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 160 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Munson 
v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P .2d 268 (1946); Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 2d 399, 
49 P.2d 832 (1935) (disbarment proceeding); Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 
229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962); Thanhauser v. Milprint, 9 App. Div. 2d 833, 192 N.Y.S.2d 911 
(1959). But see Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). 
35. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700, 702 (1965); 
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1959) (dissenting opinion) (dictum); Rogers v. 
United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938) (action for recovery of customs duties). In 
Plymouth Sedan, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that exclusion is required in for-
feiture actions whenever there is an illegal search and seizure. Part of the reason 
given, however, was that forfeitures are "quasi-criminal." See also De Reuill, Applica-
bility of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963 DuKE L.J. 472. 
36. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (dissenting opinion of 
Brandeis, J.). 
37. See, e.g., Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958), where 
plaintiff was saved from that fate only because the court, after excluding the evidence, 
found the verdict in her favor sufficiently supported by other evidence. 
38. Note, 8 UTAH L. REv. 84, 87 (1962). 
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law recognizing a right to be free from unauthorized interference
with privacy,3 9 and with the prior cases which have not demanded
state action as a prerequisite to the exclusion of objectionably
obtained evidence.40 While it is clear that because of the absence of
official participation in the search and seizure the exclusion was not
compelled by Mapp, the general aim of the case-to deter direct or
indirect invasions of privacy-is consistent with the broad policy of
the exclusionary rule. The exclusion seems justified on the ground
that the integrity of law enforcement demands that its operations not
conflict with public policy. In resolving the issue posed by the com-
peting considerations of law enforcement and the individual's right
to privacy, the principal case has accepted the basic proposition that
law enforcement and society in general are not benefited in the long
run when they permit a criminal conviction at the expense of humili-
ating intrusions by unauthorized persons upon the defendant's
privacy.
39. See generally Plant, The Right of Privacy in Michigan, Mich. State B. J., March
1954, p. 8.
40. Lebel v. Swindcki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958); People v. Corder,
[Vol. 64
